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Defined as a political and military contest over the popular support of a civilian population, the strategy of insurgency epitomises Clausewitz’ understanding of war as the continuation of politics by other means. Indeed, the centrality of the civilian population has infused the strategy with its developmental milestones, seeing changes within societies echoed by insurgent groups stemming from and targeting their support. Writing in 1937, for example, Mao advocated the utility of the printing press for guerrilla units competing for the support of rural China. In 1961, Guevara championed the importance of the radio for the Cuban Revolution and, in 1991, Hezbollah launched its independently operated, domestic television station to compete for wider Lebanese support. More recently, insurgent organisations in Afghanistan and Iraq have harnessed the information revolution to achieve an almost global messaging reach. While these more operational developments in insurgency have enjoyed sizable analytical attention, the conceptualisation of the strategy’s central element – the civilian population itself – remains comparatively under-developed and confined to those state borders in which insurgencies are considered to occur. Through a case study of the Islamic State, this research seeks to contribute to the evolving discussion of insurgency theory by exploring how contemporary migration and mobilities paradigms have affected the nature of the ‘civilian population’ within.

After having undertaken a developmental study of the Islamic State, establishing its status as an insurgent organisation and thus suitability for this study, the group’s propaganda as tailored towards selected extra-territorial populations underwent qualitative analysis. Focus was given to those sources encouraging the migration of civilian concentrations towards the Islamic State’s territory. Secondly, analytical attention was directed to the group’s organisational hierarchy for any signs of migration- or mobilities-adjacent operations having been formally institutionalised and thus representative of their purposeful incorporation into the group’s broader strategy. Thirdly, the tactical and operational character of the group’s use of force, both within its considered geographic territory and along its path of expansion, were analysed for reference to instances of forced migration away from its territories.

Preliminary results indicate the Islamic State to have catalysed its insurgency through crafting its political and violent actions with contemporary mobilities in mind. Within their established territory the group is seen to use violence to stimulate the emigration, rather than engage in the competition for the support, of non-aligned civilian populations. Insurgency’s competition for popular political support does still take place, but an analysis both of the Islamic State’s political messaging and organisational structure reveals this as having been re-located to extra-territorial populations. Understanding this requires an equal acknowledgement of the multiplicity of ‘civilian populations’ in contemporary manifestations of the strategy, with each seeing their own, tailored, contests of popular political support. Indeed, the homogenous, state-border confined conceptualisation of the ‘civilian population’ that formed the basis for the more operational developments in insurgency theory until now may have become obsolete.

These initial results hint not only at a profound change in our understanding of insurgency, but also call for a re-evaluation of those strategies designed to counter it. With extra-territorial populations now the target of insurgent contests for popular political support, counterinsurgents of the future may need to adopt a more introspective, less expeditionary approach to achieve their aims. After all, to paraphrase seminal French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula, a state free of problems is a state free of insurgency.